... evaluate entropy, and escalate only when risk is real. To avoid alert fatigue, non-critical events are reported on a schedule, while critical threats trigger instant alerts. Key material is protected with: Shamir s Secret Sharing frequent key rotation decoy keys constant-time crypto operations secure memory wiping The server cannot read messages, locations, or emergency data even if compromised. Security in MAPonME is not based on surveillance. No advertising trackers. No user profiling. No behavioral data exported. The goal ...

... evaluate entropy, and escalate only when risk is real. To avoid alert fatigue, non-critical events are reported on a schedule, while critical threats trigger instant alerts. Key material is protected with: Shamir s Secret Sharing frequent key rotation decoy keys constant-time crypto operations secure memory wiping The server cannot read messages, locations, or emergency data even if compromised. Security in MAPonME is not based on surveillance. No advertising trackers. No user profiling. No behavioral data exported. The goal ...

... MAPonME , all sensitive data is encrypted client-side: messages locations emergency data personal notes Keys are: generated locally split using Shamir s Secret Sharing mixed with decoy keys rotated frequently The server never has access to plaintext keys and cannot decrypt user content. This is zero-knowledge by design, not by policy ...