Launching today

DCP
Give your AI agents encrypted permission and keys
52 followers
Give your AI agents encrypted permission and keys
52 followers
Today, many agents read keys and sensitive info from dotenv files, configs, or memory. One bad prompt or compromised tool can drain your wallet, API bill, or private data. DCP makes agents safe for real work: your wallets and API keys stay encrypted on your own machine. Give each agent only the scopes it needs; it asks, you approve from Telegram or App. Daily budgets, logs, and instant revoke keep you in control. Open source, non-custodial, and works with Claude, Cursor, OpenClaw, and Hermes.











DCP
Hey PH! I’m Iftakhar, building DCP.
AI agents are moving from answering questions to executing real work: signing transactions, using API keys, making payments, and calling tools across apps.
But there’s a problem: agents should not hold private keys, raw credentials, or sensitive information.
DCP is my attempt to solve that. It is a local permission vault for AI agents.
The flow is simple:
agent asks
you approve on Telegram or in the app
DCP signs locally
secret never enters the model context
What works today:
- desktop app
- local encrypted vault
- Telegram approvals
- Solana wallet signing
- API credential storage
- budgets and approval limits
- MCP-compatible agent flow
- open source repo
I built this because I think the next bottleneck for agents is not intelligence. It is permission.
If agents are going to act for us, they need a safe way to use wallets, credentials, and sensitive tools without taking custody.
Would love feedback from people building agents, wallets, MCP tools, x402 apps, or anything around agent commerce.
Website: https://dcpagent.com
Docs: https://dcpagent.com/docs
Download: https://dcpagent.com/#download
GitHub: https://github.com/1lystore/dcp
@iftakhar_rahmany Congrats on the launch Iftakhar 🎉
Permission as the next bottleneck rather than intelligence is the right framing.
Question on the deployment model: the vault is a local desktop app and signs locally, which is clean for an agent running on my own machine. But a lot of agents now run server-side or in hosted environments, not next to a desktop. How does DCP work when the agent lives on a remote host? Does the vault need to run on the same machine, is there a daemon/relay pattern, or is the local-desktop model an intentional scope choice for now? Asking because "non-custodial + local" and "my agent runs in the cloud" are in tension, and that gap is where permission tools usually have to make a hard architectural call.
the harder question underneath this product is whether detecting AI use in a technical interview is actually the right goal. a senior engineer who knows how to use AI tools effectively might be more valuable than one who can whiteboard without them. curious if there's a way to configure what counts as unauthorized versus what's just how people actually work now
DCP
@ansari_adin Thanks Ansari, I think this may have been meant for another launch today, but I agree with the broader point that AI tools are becoming part of real workflows.
For DCP, we’re focused on the permission layer: how agents can safely use wallets, keys, and sensitive tools without directly holding secrets.
DCP
@lakshminath_dondeti
Exactly, that’s the core problem DCP is built around.
I don’t think agents should directly hold private keys. They should request an action, show the scope/amount/destination, and let the user approve or reject it.
If the agent makes the wrong decision, DCP gives you guardrails: budgets, approval limits, logs, and instant revoke. The agent can ask, but it should not have custody.
Congrats on the launch! One question, if we hit the daily cap does it pause and wait for next day or does it notify you?
DCP
@prateek_kumar28 Thanks Prateek, good question.
If the daily cap is reached, agent can’t continue under that budget. The user gets notified, and they can either raise the limit manually or wait for the next budget window.
The goal is that agents can automate work, but they should never silently exceed the permission you gave them.