VeilType launches today, and I m looking for people willing to test it critically, not just glance at the page.
The workflow is: type or attach content -> encrypt locally in the Android keyboard -> send through an existing messenger -> open offline with a password or recipient key.
Please try to break one part of that flow: text, voice, photo, video, file transfer, or offline opening. Tell me where it becomes confusing, what trust evidence is missing, and which Android device or messenger you used.
Launch page: https://www.producthunt.com/prod...
Clipboard encryption for copied text would be huge. Right now if someone copies something I typed with VeilType and pastes it elsewhere, that bypasses the protection entirely. Maybe add an option to auto clear or encrypt clipboard contents after a set time.
Thank you, this is exactly the kind of edge case we want surfaced. VeilType already treats clipboard use as a fallback and can clear copied plaintext automatically after a short timeout, but your point is valid: once text is copied into another app, no keyboard can reliably control every subsequent paste or clipboard manager. We should make that boundary much clearer and add a configurable timeout plus an explicit “encrypt clipboard” action that replaces clipboard text with a Veil capsule before sharing. I’ll add both to the acceptance test list. Which timeout would feel practical to you: 15 seconds, 30 seconds, or immediately after the first paste?
Honestly the encrypt-from-keyboard idea is really clever, but adding a quick contact list for people you regularly send encrypted stuff to would save a lot of time. Right now having to look up or paste someone's key every time kind of defeats the convenience factor for daily use.
@yaarrh38 You’re right: recipient encryption should feel like choosing a person, not handling a key every time. The next UX step is a local-only contacts and favorites list that stores each recipient’s public key and fingerprint, supports QR import, and never uploads the address book or keys to a server. Private keys would remain device-side. We should also show recent recipients and require fingerprint confirmation only when a key is first added or changes. For daily use, would you prefer a compact name/avatar picker, or a picker that always keeps the key fingerprint visible?
The uncomfortable question is: why trust another Android keyboard?
You should not trust it by default. Trust should be earned through evidence: no INTERNET permission in the production APK, a publicly reviewable core, an exact release hash, offline two-device testing, and rejection of modified capsules.
Which missing proof would matter most before you tried it: an independent audit, a reproducible APK build, or broader messenger compatibility results?
finally a keyboard that handles encrypted voice clips too, the setup was quick and the decrypt step felt seamless when a friend sent one back.
@ouzkx88 Thanks for testing the complete voice loop with another person. Voice capsules were one of the workflows we most needed real-device feedback on, especially recording, transfer, decryption and playback. To make this result reproducible, could you share the two Android models and the messenger you used? Also, did playback inside the keyboard feel natural, or was there any step where the capsule/import flow was unclear?
Contact update for testing, licensing, B2B pilots, SDK or white-label discussions: support@truelock.pro. I also personally monitor dkatsura1@gmail.com. Please include your Android model, messenger and intended workflow; do not send passwords, private keys or sensitive content by email.