Launched this week
Samayuktam SPCMP
Tamper-evident proofs for compressed data.
2 followers
Tamper-evident proofs for compressed data.
2 followers
A checksum says the bytes match, and anyone who rewrites the file can recompute it. SPCMP commits the decoded data to a Merkle root and signs the file with Ed25519, so you can prove it hasn’t changed since it was sealed. Pricing and tests are public.
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I built SPCMP because data pipelines run on a “trust me” model. Data gets exported, compressed, encrypted and stored, and the only proof it’s intact is a checksum on the file. A checksum says the bytes match. It doesn’t say the decoded data is what was originally sealed, and anyone who can rewrite the file can recompute it.
SPCMP seals float32 data (a database export to float32.bin, for example) by committing the decoded content to a Merkle root, then signing the exact file bytes with a detached Ed25519 signature. Anything altered after sealing fails verification before it’s trusted. It doesn’t prove the data was correct to begin with, only that it hasn’t changed since it was sealed.
To be upfront, it’s not a better compressor. On a 29 MiB SQLite test, zstd and xz produced smaller files. The value is the commitment and the exact restore, apart from signed zeros and NaN payloads, which are collapsed by design.
The engine is closed-source because I’m a solo founder protecting the IP, but the trust model is open for audit. In an exhaustive test on a 1,000-element file, 38,430 of 38,440 single-bit flips were rejected. The other 10 decoded to identical content, which is exactly why Layer 2 signs the exact bytes. Everything is on the site.
No “Book a Demo” calls. Pricing and test reports are public. For a free trial (5 uses, 1 day) on your own data, email me at swapnopam@samayuktam.com.
Happy to answer technical questions, and attack ideas are welcome.