Most SMB security stops at the tunnel. Omamori adds two filters after it: DNS blocks the lookup against 1.7M known-bad domains, and a post-DNS IP filter blocks the connection even when DNS is bypassed - hardcoded IPs, DoH, resolvers you don't control. Device posture is checked before the tunnel comes up: disk encryption, antivirus, firewall, screen lock, minimum OS. Per-OS rules, no code. Each client gets a dedicated server, not a shared pool. Built MSP-first for multi-tenant management.
Hey Product Hunt 👋
I'm Kanak, one of three co-founders behind Omamori.
We kept seeing the same pattern in small-company breaches: the network was "secure" because everyone was on a VPN. Then a device with no disk encryption connected from a coffee shop, or malware landed and phoned home to a hardcoded IP that DNS filtering never saw. The tunnel was fine. Everything after the tunnel wasn't.
So Omamori is built around what happens before and after the connection:
Before, devices are checked against your policy before the tunnel comes up. Disk encryption, antivirus, firewall, screen lock, minimum OS version. Different rules per OS, no code.
After, two filters. DNS blocks the lookup against a base list of ~1.7M known-bad domains and IPs. A post-DNS IP filter blocks the connection itself, which catches hardcoded IPs, DoH, and resolvers you don't control.
Each client gets a dedicated server rather than a shared pool, and the whole thing is multi-tenant because we built it MSP-first.
What it doesn't do: patching, EDR, email security, or anything about SaaS apps we don't sit in front of. It won't stop malware from executing locally, it stops it from reaching what it needs to reach. We'd rather say that here than have you find out in month two.
For the launch we've opened a free trial: your own dedicated instance, up to 20 users, two weeks. Not a shared pool, every client gets isolated infrastructure. Trials run on slightly lighter hardware than paid plans, but the architecture and every feature are identical. No card.
Two things I'd genuinely like input on:
Where the default-deny line should sit. Right now IP rules are blocklist-first with allowlisting available. Full default-deny egress is the stronger security posture, but it's real work to maintain, I'm not sure SMBs want it and I'd rather hear that from you than guess.
And for the MSPs here: what does onboarding a client actually need to look like before it's worth switching from what you have?
Happy to answer anything, including the uncomfortable ones. I'll be here all day.