The problem everyone's ignoring Every end-to-end encrypted messenger already has strong cryptography. That's not the weak link. The weak link is who holds the keys. Signal holds a key directory. iMessage has Apple's identity servers. WhatsApp registers your phone number. Every one of them can be compelled — subpoena the custodian, get the graph of who talked to whom. Occulta is built on a different premise: you collect and own every key yourself. How it works Install. Generate. Done. No account. No phone number. No sign-up form. Your identity is a P-256 key pair generated in the Secure Enclave on first launch — hardware-bound, never exportable, never backed up, never seen by us. Exchange keys in person. Hold two iPhones within 25 cm. Apple's UWB chip confirms proximity. The key transfers directly between devices — no server ever relays it. This physical gate is why man-in-the-middle attacks are structurally impossible, not just mitigated. Diceware verification. After the exchange, both phones show the same short phrase. You say it out loud to your contact. If it matches, the key is authentic. SSH-fingerprint trust — done right. Encrypt anything for anyone in your collection. Files, photos, videos, documents. Send the encrypted bundle over iMessage, AirDrop, email, Signal, a USB drive — whatever. Security lives in the key, not the transport. One channel goes dark, use another. What's under the hood Secure Enclave identity key — P-256, generated inside the SE chip. Even a compromised OS can't extract it. AES-256-GCM encryption with a random 96-bit nonce per payload Forward secrecy — per-message ephemeral keys via a peer-to-peer prekey protocol (no rendezvous server required) Post-quantum protection (iOS 26+) — ML-KEM-1024 hybrid alongside classical ECDH. Harvest-now-decrypt-later isn't a future problem you can patch later. Apple frameworks only — CryptoKit, Security.framework, NearbyInteraction, MultipeerConnectivity. Zero third-party crypto. Zero supply-chain risk. No backend. Anywhere. There's nothing to subpoena. Honest limits (because you should know) iOS only — the Secure Enclave and UWB hardware combination isn't available elsewhere Doesn't hide transport metadata — an .occ file sent over iMessage still tells Apple two endpoints exchanged something Can't defend against endpoint compromise (Pegasus-style). No messenger on earth can. Keys are device-local by design — lose the phone, lose the contact collection Open source — Apache 2.0 The protocol is documented. The code is on GitHub. Trust shouldn't require faith. App Store: https://apps.apple.com/us/app/oc... GitHub: https://github.com/aibo-cora/occ...

Occulta

Encrypted by proximity. No servers. No accounts. Ever.

Encrypted by proximity. No servers. No accounts. Ever.