DungeonQ is a defensive deception runtime for suspicious AI-agent sessions. A trusted gateway routes a designated session into a persistent synthetic world, with useful world-only Wrong Tickets, observable activity and separately approved bounded changes. The goal is to give people and authorized defender agents room to act.
v0.16 addresses a concrete lesson: protecting one route is not enough.
In the earlier Sol experiment, all three diverted sessions received the artificial target through an open alternate source, A2, despite zero reads through the main source route. Those failures remain published.
The repair applies shared tenant, resource and credential-version checks to the main source, alternate source, cache and export. A2 keeps no target copy. Cached content requires a fresh authority check; an unavailable origin produces UNKNOWN instead of stale disclosure. A world ticket or claimed role cannot grant source access.
DungeonQ's goal is to give security teams and authorized defender agents time and space to respond while a designated suspicious session works in a persistent synthetic world.
v0.15.0 adds a reproducible console showing the next step: what happens after an alert?
1. A real MCP client enters the workspace, checks conflicting claims and saves a note that survives restart. Wrong Tickets remain useful only inside their issuing world. A claimed "source restored" message does not change the route. Follow-up work is bounded and offers a stop; participant text cannot authorize operator changes.
2. A separate local receiver acknowledges an alert and rotates a temporary connector credential. Readbacks check that old authority and old-ticket use are denied, authorized new reads work, and those results survive restart.
